Metaphor in cognitive linguistics is understood as a mapping where properties from one domain -the source -are transferred onto another domain: the target. The conceptual associations between source and target have usually been considered universal, unidirectional, and usage-based. One of the issues generally taken for granted, yet often underexplored, is the critical role of the notion of culture when characterizing conceptual metaphor. In this paper, we revisit and problematize the concepts of universality, unidirectionality, and usage-basedness and argue in favour of a broader-scoped approach to metaphor that brings in the notion of culture as key to metaphor research. By 'culture', we mean two, related things: (a) shared beliefs, knowledge, and world view(s) characterizing national, ethnic, and speech communities; and (b) the discourse communities using metaphor: i.e., those subcultures within broader cultural frames that are characterized by specific knowledge schemas, needs, and interests. To do so, we look into metaphors used by non-Western cultures and the architectural community when expressing the ways they perceive and think about their worlds.
INTRODUCTION
Conceptual metaphor in cognitive linguistics (henceforth, CMT) is understood as a mapping between two conceptual domains, where properties from one domain -the source -are transferred onto another domain: the target. The conceptual associations between source and target have usually been considered universal: grounded on an experiential bodily basis shared by all human beings; and unidirectional: the -usually abstract -target domain is understood by means of information mapped from the -usually physical or more concrete -source domain but not vice versa. In other words, the brunt of the metaphorical construal of the target domain is born by the source domain. Cognitive linguistics is to be included in what are known as usage-based approaches to language given the emphasis placed on exploring and discussing real instances of verbal interaction: i.e., the well-known linguistic notion of performance; rather than on combinatory, syntactic abilities: i.e., competence, as illustrated in hypothetical, well-formed sentences.
Two other key notions in the paradigm are motivation and embodiment, both used to explain how human cognition works -metaphor included. According to Johnson, '…meaning and value are grounded in the nature of our bodies and brains, as they develop through ongoing interactions with various environments that have physical, social, and cultural dimensions. The nature of our embodied experience motivates and constrains how things are meaningful to us' (Johnson 1997: 154) .
As Johnson points out, while physical configuration is indeed paramount to embodiment, it relies on culture as well. 1 Sinha and Jensen de López offer a similar view, warning that, in defining embodiment, people have 'failed to pay sufficient attention to the importance of culture and society in human cognition, in the motivation of linguistic structure, and in the acquisition of language' (Sinha & Jensen de López 2000: 20 ; see also Ibarretxe-Antuñano 2008 , 2013 .
In short, although the relationship between culture and conceptual metaphor has recently received more attention from some cognitive linguistics scholars (see e.g. Kövecses 2005 , Sharifian et al. 2008 , Yu 2009 ), the critical role of culture in characterizing conceptual metaphor remains under-explored.
Consider this definition of embodiment from Evans' (2007: 68) A Glossary of Cognitive Linguistics:
Embodiment. Pertains to the body, especially species-specific physiology and anatomy. Physiology has to do with biological morphology, which is to say body parts and organisation, such as having hands, arms and (bare) skin rather than wings and feathers. Anatomy has to with internal organisation of the body. This includes the neural architecture of an organism, which is to say the brain and the nervous system. The notion of embodiment plays an important role in many cognitive linguistic theories.
This paper sees culture as encompassing two, related notions. On the one hand, it refers to the shared beliefs, knowledge, and world view(s) characterizing broad national, ethnic, or speech communities;
on the other, it refers to the communities -or sub-cultures -sharing knowledge schemas, needs, interests, and language, as subsumed within the forementioned broad cultural frame -or Culture with a capital C.
The importance of taking culture into account in metaphor research is illustrated by such a conventional metaphor in the West as UNDERSTANDING/KNOWING IS SEEING, whereby an adjective like blind or a verb like see is used to express '(not) understanding': e.g., how could you have been so blind and not seen what your son was up to? However, as Evans and Wilkins (2000) describe, in
Australian aboriginal cultures and languages, the notion of understanding is expressed via the sense of hearing: i.e., the metaphor UNDERSTANDING/KNOWING IS HEARING. In other words, different Cultures convey the same reality by drawing on different metaphorical sources. Matters get even more complicated when one moves beyond everyday communication to focus on specific communities within a Culture: e.g., architects, who share a professional practice and concomitant worldview and language, use blind as an adjective to describe a structure without windows: i.e., without openings to the 'outside' world.
These examples point to the controversial quality of universality, uni-directionality, and usagebasedness as they stand in mainstream CMT. A look at discourses and communities suggests that (a) metaphors depend, to large extent, on interaction with the world mediated through culture: e.g., the use of different perception sources to articulate the targets of cognition targets; (b) metaphorical mappings need not involve abstract targets, as illustrated by architectural metaphors using visual metaphor to map physical sources onto physical targets, as in the expression blind building; and (c) the term 'usage-based' is often interpreted narrowly: most CMT research is still lexis-or sentence-based.
In this paper, we argue in favour of a broader-scoped approach to metaphor where the forementioned tenets are refined and validated, incorporating the two notions of culture described above. To do so, we explore the semantic fields of perception and motion as they appear in different
Cultures and cultures. The reason for choosing these two conceptual domains is that they have received a great deal of attention in mainstream cognitive linguistics (see e.g. Talmy 2000 , Sweetser 1990 ).
In the next section, we overview the problems derived from the CMT issues introduced above.
We then use our discussion of real corpus data to underline the importance in metaphor research of paying attention to culture. Finally, we attempt to integrate the notions of Culture and culture in metaphor research.
REVISITING ISSUES FROM CMT
CMT set out to explain thoroughly the figurative workings of mind, picking up on longstanding philosophical concerns over the imaginative and anthropomorphic basis of logos: i.e., of human thought and language. CMT questioned basic postulates in other well-known theories of metaphor such as 'interaction' and 'comparison' (see the papers in Ortony 1993). The cognitive approach starts by assuming the creative potential of metaphor, defining metaphor as 'understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another' (Lakoff & Johnson 1980: 5) . It follows that such 'understanding and experiencing' is intrinsically new: i.e., reality is created in the metaphorical process. A second important postulate is the conventional status of metaphor in human thought and communicationeven though conventional metaphors may, of course, be further exploited in more innovative or markedly figurative ways. One of CMT's strong points is precisely that it has shown the systematicity of metaphor in human thinking. Third, metaphor is described as a cognitive mechanism determined and motivated by interaction in the world: i.e., constrained by one's particular body and mind configuration as described by the notion of embodiment. Embodiment is shared (presumably) by all human beings: it is universal. Fourth, from the outset, CMT has rested on the basic premise that metaphor and culture are intimately related. A good case in point is the notion of Idealized Cognitive
Models or folk models developed in (Lakoff 1987) . Finally, CMT scholars strive to differentiate metaphor as a cognitive mechanism from metaphorical language: i.e., the instantiation of conceptual metaphor (Kövecses 2002) , where 'language' concerns not only oral and written data but visual data as well: e.g., gesture (Cienki & Müller 2008) .
Although the CMT paradigm represented a breakthrough in metaphor research in the 1980s, some of its postulates have lately been criticized or revisited. One of the main criticisms is that most of the evidence used to prove that metaphor is a systematic conceptual mechanism is based on language:
usually de-contextualized language, in the broad sense. This criticism has several angles worth exploring in more detail, one of which is the alleged circularity of reasoning in CMT research. As Valenzuela (2009: 237) puts it: 'a common methodology in metaphor theory has been to group together a given number of linguistic expressions, which are found to share certain common characteristics, and then use these expressions to propose a given conceptual metaphor; this conceptual metaphor is in turn used to explain why there is such a numerous group of these linguistic expressions'.
Of course, the importance of non-linguistic data to supporting the conceptual nature of metaphor is not new in cognitive linguistics (see e.g. Gibbs 1994 but also on linguistic and cultural conventions: e.g., Santiago and colleagues (2007) demonstrate that, in TIME IS SPACE, TIME is mapped not only on up-down and front-back spatial axes but also on a leftright horizontal axis, where the future is located to the right or left depending on the direction of reading and writing. This supports our main claim in this paper: namely, that C(c)ulture plays a crucial role in metaphor -or, as Palmer and Sharifian claim, 'embodied categories are framed by cultural knowledge and practice' (Palmer & Sharifian 2007: 2) .
Meanwhile, the growing body of cross-linguistic research in CMT has shown that, although some conceptual metaphors are similarly instantiated across languages, they are far from universal and must be interpreted within a specific cultural frame. This research avoids the 'linguacentrism' that lingers in some cognitive linguistic analyses (see Palmer 2003) . We further elaborate this in Section 3.1, where we discuss perception metaphors.
Another point of contention is the lexis-or sentence-basedness of most CMT research, i.e. the lack of research on the pragmatics of metaphor in discourse contexts where it helps articulate topics and manage the author-reader interactions (Zinken, Hellsten & Nerlich 2008; Lakoff 2004) . The strong cognitive bias of mainstream CMT has been questioned implicitly or explicitly by more applied or discourse-oriented metaphor scholars (Caballero 2003 (Caballero , 2006 (Caballero , 2007 Cameron & Deignan 2006; Kimmel 2010; Steen 2007) . Although starting from linguistic evidence, the description and classification of figurative phenomena are still done at a cognitive level, top-down: i.e., the focus is on deep-level cognitive mappings irrespective of the diverse ways they may be instantiated. As Goatly puts it (1997: 42), 'cognitive metaphors have to find expression in some medium, and when the medium is language the form of the expression will have important consequences for their recognition and interpretation'.
Playing down the diverse ways in which metaphor is realized is risky for a number of reasons.
First, it helps preserve one of the most debatable aspects of the theory: i.e., the close link between figurative language and conceptual mappings in the brain. Second, it disregards the role language (i.e., discourse interaction) may play in metaphor entrenchment and, hence, in metaphor 'health' and evolution. MacArthur (2005) argues that the shared understanding of notions of control among speakers of Spanish and English --the surface manifestation of which is seen in metaphors related to horse riding -arises not from embodiment or direct experience but as a consequence of language use.
In similar fashion, Caballero (2012) describes how several metaphors are enriched, re-elaborated, and conventionalized within the tennis community through repeated use. Given the cultural status of language, this implies viewing the relationship between metaphor and culture as unidirectional rather than bidirectional.
The position we adopt in this paper is not radically at odds with CMT. We start from one basic assumption: claiming that human reasoning is largely metaphorical requires exploring both the role of metaphor in cognition and how people use metaphor to communicate. Metaphor is both a conceptual and a socialization tool: one that is partly acquired and put to work through discourse interaction. One needs to incorporate cognitive, linguistic, and cultural aspects of figurative phenomena in research aimed at explaining how and why people interact through metaphor. One must combine a cognitive with a discourse perspective on metaphor if one hopes to gain reliable insights. Of course, a discourse approach is not exempt from problems, either. Three related hot topics in contemporary metaphor research concern the data used: both the identification of metaphor from the data and the interpretation of metaphorical instances.
The use of corpora -both large and more ad hoc, community-specific corpora -has become the phenomenon under analysis is no mere accident but is recurrently used by identifiable communities. Corpus-based approaches strive to explore metaphor from a scientific, real-use perspective. Their main goal is to identify metaphors from their linguistic instantiation in corpora while examining the role of these metaphors in building the ontology of more broadly or narrowly defined communities. Note that, while this is an important and, indeed, necessary development, most studies remain very much lexically rooted: their analysis does not go beyond the sentence level.
The conventional/creative metaphor distinction typically derived from these studies remains very much in agreement with traditional CMT. Unconventional metaphorical language not only shows how members of certain communities exploit conventional shared metaphor (Caballero 2012) but may also provide an alternate view on unquestioned tenets of CMT. Abstract or metaphorical motion is a case in point. Customarily, it has been explored in general discourse: usually narrative; yet, when one moves to more specific contexts, the phenomenon renders a much interesting -if occasionally disturbingpicture, as we discuss in Section 3.2.
Metaphor identification is problematic, giving rise to recent attempts to build an objective, scientific procedure for it (Pragglejaz Group 2007 , Steen 2007 , Steen et al. 2010 . The discussion proceeds in two directions. First, in determining whether a given use of language is metaphorical or not, the identification procedure returns to the creative/conventional opposition; see the discussion on 'deliberate' metaphors in (Steen 2008 , Steen et al. 2010 ) and on 'emergent' metaphors in (Cameron & Deignan 2006 ). 2 Second, it strives to determine an optimal or operative unit of analysis (Pragglejaz Group 2007 , Steen et al. 2010 .
Despite the insights gleaned, metaphor identification remains an issue in all these approaches.
Before taking this point further, we offer two examples from architectural texts:
( As Caballero (2006) describes, these two examples were shown to four architects, who were asked whether they thought the term wings in (1) meant the same as wing in (2). All acknowledged the figurative and visual quality of the description in (1), yet did not comment upon wing in (2). In other words, although both examples instantiate the same metaphor, using the resemblance of spatial volumes to actual wings, the architects regarded wings in (1) as metaphorical but wing in (2) as a conventional reference to a spatial volume. They further related the image suggested by wings in (1) with the imagistic verb embrace. None was able to explain why (1) felt more metaphorical than (2).
This brief digression may be used to address the three forementioned issues in contemporary metaphor research. The architects' reaction shows that the metaphorical status of an expression may result from the disparity of the experiential domains involved and not only the way it appears in a particular text. Incongruity and salience are quite different issues when identifying metaphorical language in texts. Conventional -hence, usually inconspicuous -metaphorical language can be reelaborated or exploited rhetorically, which makes it feel more saliently figurative. Accordingly, although idiosyncrasies of the knowledge projection involved in diverse metaphorical mappings may be discussed in terms of concepts, the formal and contextual aspects intrinsic to their actual instantiation need to be considered if one wants to gain insight into metaphor. As Deignan (2005) suggests, word-by-word identification and analysis is not only time-consuming, it may sometimes be wasteful. The figurative quality of wings in (1) versus the non-figurative quality of wing in (2) may best be made clear by considering the sentences in context rather than analyzing them according to their constituents. Finally, metaphoricity may be seen as a matter of degree: not all metaphorical language is regarded as such by all people, underlining the role of context and social convention in metaphor awareness and identification: hence, the importance of taking culture into account to explore metaphor in all its complexity.
INTEGRATING THE NOTION OF CULTURE IN METAPHOR RESEARCH: PERCEPTION AND MOTION IN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
As pointed out in the introduction, culture covers two related notions, what we have called Culture and culture (those cultures articulating Culture). Taking both notions into account is essential to metaphor research for practical and theoretical reasons. In the first place, it may help identify the metaphors underlying the worldview and language of cultures within a broader Cultural frame as well as explore how they become conventionalized (entrenched), expanded, and enriched by the members of a community. If one bears in mind that discourse communities are characterized by distinctive knowledge schemas, needs, and interests, one may reasonably expect that the ways metaphor is understood will differ radically across communities.
Looking into how metaphor is used by various cultures may shed light into how the production and interpretation of metaphor are affected by the specificity of the community using it. In what follows, we follow this line of argument, illustrating it with examples from two conceptual domains: perception and motion. Our goal is to show that the conceptual grounding of metaphor needs to be validated by the C/culture sieve: i.e., that which mediates between the corporeal and sociocultural dimensions of embodiment. This sieve plays an instrumental role in the way physical, sensorimotorgrounding universal experiences pass through the complex and socially acquired beliefs, knowledge, and worldwiew(s) intrinsic to one or several communities: i.e., C/cultures. As Gibbs puts it (2006: 9): 'people's subjective, felt experiences or their bodies in action provide part of the fundamental grounding for language and thought. Cognition is what occurs when the body engages the physical, cultural world and must be studied in terms of the dynamical interactions between people and the environment'. If, as Silverstein (2004) claims, culture is articulated and made manifest through patterned ('genred'), interactive negotiation of meanings and values, then using a genre-based approach may provide useful insight into the cultural roots of metaphor.
Perception metaphors in language and Culture(s)
The senses may be described as the channels through which people gather up-to-date information about the world (Barlow & Mollon 1982; Blake & Sekuler 2005; Classen 1993 Classen , 1997 Goldstein 2009; HHMI 1995; Howes 2004; Rouby et al. 2002) . The role of the senses as information channels impinges upon language. Many sense-related words show how the senses are used to conceptualize such domains as understanding, obedience, (dis)pleasure, and so on. Perception metaphors have been discussed in cognitive linguistics since the pioneering work of Sweetser (1990) , who showed the systematic relations between perception through the senses -especially, the so-called 'major' modalities or 'far senses' such as vision and hearing -and the internal self and sensations. Other scholars have since shown that the 'minor' senses of smell, touch, and taste are likewise richer than expected in terms of metaphorical mappings (Ibarretxe-Antuñano 1999a /b, 2002 Viberg 1983 Viberg , 1984 Viberg , 2001 ).
Most of this early work focuses on perception metaphors allegedly shared by speakers from different languages. The reason why researchers focused on 'universal' metaphors is clear. Their main goal was to show that these metaphors are embodied: i.e., grounded in daily experience.
UNDERSTANDING/KNOWING IS SEEING is a thoroughly discussed conceptual metaphor in this respect. It is instantiated by expressions such as clear argument, I see your point, or opaque discussion and generally considered a good example of a universally-motivated mapping between two conceptual domains. According to Sweetser (1990: 45) , vision is the primary modality from which verbs of higher cognitive activity -e.g., 'knowing', 'understanding', and 'thinking' -are recruited. Her views are shared by psychologists and psycholinguists such as Gardner (1983) and Arnheim (1969) , who also consider vision the most important sense, claiming that the association between vision and cognition is a natural one. The perceptual experience one undergoes when one uses vision, and its immediate results of quick, direct, and trustworthy information, may explain why this sense in particular is linked to 'understanding' -in contrast to other sense modalities such as smell, which is linked to 'guessing', 'suspecting', and 'sensing' instead, as illustrated by examples (3) and (4) Vision allows one to detect and identify objects immediately and accurately. Using smell, one can detect odors easily, but identifying them is more difficult (Engen 1991) : what perception psychologists know as the 'tip of the nose' phenomenon (Lawless & Engen 1977) . When one perceives via these senses, one formulates hypotheses about the nature of the objects one perceives that correspondmore or less accurately -to the nature of the real object. The information gathered by vision and the hypotheses formulated on the basis of that information are more reliable than those garnered from smell. The prototypical properties of vision 4 explain not only the different meanings of (3) and (4) but also the different values of parts of speech such as perception evidentials, among whom visual evidentials provide the highest degree of reliability (Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998 Barnes 1984; De Haan 2005; Perrot 1996; Willett 1988 Australian languages are not the exception that proves the rule: similar mappings are found in other languages. Devereux (1991) reports that the Sedang Moi in Indochina conceptualize the ear as the seat of reason. Expressions such as tlek ('deaf') and oh ta ay tue(n) (literally 'has no ear') are used to describe people who lack intelligence. Mayer (1982) likewise reports that in Ommura, Papua New Guinea, all intellectual processes are associated with the auditory system. Everything concerning motives, thoughts, and intentions is 'in the ear'; verbs such as iero mean both 'to hear (a sound)' and 'to know, to understand'. Seeger (1975) Cultures exist where several perceptual modalities work together in conceptualizing cognition.
The Shipibo-Conibo Indians of Peru are reported (Gebhart-Sayer 1985) to combine visual, auditory, and olfactory perceptions to form a body of shamanic cognition.
What these examples show is not only that UNDERSTANDING / KNOWING IS SEEING is far from universal but also, as pointed out by several anthropologists (e.g., Howes 1991 Howes , 2003 Howes , 2004 Ong 1991; Tyler 1984) , the omnipresent Western perspective somehow 'pollutes' conceptual reality in the perception domain. In sum, vision plays a salient role in our conceptualization of the intellect, but this salience is neither shared by all cultures nor present in older stages of Indo-European culture. Tyler Together, the forementioned linguistic and anthropological research has important consequences for the analysis of perception-based conceptual metaphor. The motivation for and grounding of these semantic extensions cannot be explained solely by means of a common body basis: culture is also a key factor in human thought. As Ong (1991: 26) another is silent' (Majid and Levinson 2011: 16) . It demonstrates that the conceptual grounding of metaphor really is based both on the body (i.e., sensorimotor experience) and culture.
One need not resort to remote non-Western cultures to show that metaphors -no matter how 'successful' they may be in a language -need to pass the culture sieve to be understood correctly. This culture sieve may be understood in two, complementary ways. On the one hand, one should ask how pervasive and salient the link between vision and intellect is in languages where the metaphor is found: the metaphor UNDERSTANDING / KNOWING IS SEEING may exist in a language/culture but not be the only sense perception related to understanding, nor be the most used expression for this domain.
For example, although (5) shows that Basque employs the metaphor, when somebody wants to say that a person knows a lot / is wise / is an expert, the expression used is aditua ('hear/listen.past participle.determiner'): i.e., the sense domain is hearing, not vision. Spanish is another example. The verb ver ('see') is also related to the intellect, but the sense-related verb that Spanish speakers use for knowing is saber (from the Latin sapere: 'to taste'). Viberg (2008) argues that, although vision is related to understanding in Swedish, the relation is not so pervasive as in English. He compares (11) Le tocó sacarse la lotería ('he.dat touched took.out the lottery': 'he won the lottery').
What is interesting about these examples is that the interpretation of a Peninsular Spanish and a
Mexican Spanish speaker might not be the same, given their different cultural backgrounds. In both cases, due to the affective dative construction in which the verb tocar ('touch') occurs, participants are considered to be passive and affected by the event: i.e., experiencers (Maldonado 1999) . That said, according to González-González (2010) , the Mexican speaker would necessarily think of predestination: either religious (i.e., God's will) or not depending on the speaker's beliefs. This can be explained by taking into account the 'fatalist' viewpoint of Mexicans: the view that all are governed by destiny or God's will and cannot help it. In consequence, they see themselves as victims of predestination.
Motion metaphors in language and culture(s)
Along with being sensitive to the broad cultural environment of peoples, metaphor also responds to 'narrower' contextual factors. To understand the mechanics of metaphor, one must take into account the topics it helps articulate, the people using it to communicate, and the goals fulfilled by the interaction in which it plays a role. Since all three are defining traits of genre, a concomitant approach seems worth trying in metaphor research. If one really wants to understand the ways metaphor and culture interact, then bringing in both the co-textual and contextual factors determining figurative uses of language may shed light on the culture/metaphor relationship.
To see the benefits of a genre-based approach to metaphor, consider the phenomenon variously known as abstract motion (Langacker 1986) , subjective motion (Matsumoto 1996) or fictive motion (Talmy 1996 , Matlock 2004 ) whereby motion verbs that typically convey actual displacements from one place to another are used to describe static scenes instead. While climb in my brother likes to climb the mountains near our house expresses a real motion event, the road climbs the mountain describes the upward trajectory of a road: an intrinsically static entity. Lakoff and Turner (1989: 142-144) regard this phenomenon as an instance of the metaphor FORM IS MOTION whereby understanding of certain spatial arrangements and topologies rests on particular ways of moving: i.e., the locational use of motion patterns is motivated by a metaphor where motion is mapped onto form or shape. In contrast, Langacker (1986) claims that such expressions do not instantiate a mapping from a spatial onto a non-spatial domain but designate a spatial configuration as dynamically construed by the speaker or writer. In the example above, this construal invokes the road as seen or profiled in full: i.e., imagined and verbalized through the simultaneous activation of every location in its spatiotemporal base. The road climbs up the mountain conveys a certain sense of motion, but this does not imply a metaphorical mapping from a motion domain onto a spatial one.
Finally, Talmy (1996) suggests that fictive-motion expressions concerned with spatial descriptions are metaphorically motivated regardless of whether they evoke actual motion for every speaker. By framing the expressions within the broader notion of ception, which encompasses both perception and conception, Talmy brings to mind Lakoff and Turner's (1989) forementioned FORM IS MOTION while drawing attention to the phenomenon's simultaneous perceptual -specifically visual -and conceptual qualities.
The default context for researching fictive or abstract motion has been general discourse, the data under scrutiny often replicating explanations provided by cognitive scholars. When one moves towards more specific contexts where motion verbs are used to predicate static entities, one gets a more interesting picture. By way of illustration, consider the following examples: In a conventional narrative scenario, the verb ease expresses gentle, easy motion. Although this semantic information is preserved in these examples, the verb is used to convey radically different things, instantiating metaphors concerned with the sensory experiences afforded by a spatial arrangement and a wine respectively. In (12), ease describes what a building looks like in its spatial context. By contrast, in (13), ease somehow blends what a wine smells, tastes, and feels like inside the mouth -taste being inextricably linked to smell and touch (Caballero 2007 , Caballero & Suárez-Toste 2010 . The examples illustrate metaphors where information from the MOTION source domain is recruited to describe properties of buildings and wines as perceived by the speaker or writer.
In architectural and wine discourse, part of the interest in motion metaphors lies in the physicality of both the source and the target domains. A core assumption in CMT is that abstract thinking is heavily determined by the functioning of the human body: concrete experiences in and with the world provide the basic data for understanding abstract, non-concrete things (Lakoff & Johnson 1980 .
Nevertheless, although helping understanding of the most abstract via the most concrete is one of the most salient properties of metaphor, this does not rule out the concreteness of both source and target in certain metaphors, as illustrated by (12) (15) describe flavours as subtle but noticeable -following the semantic properties of these verbs.
Regarding persistence, often the higher the intensity the lower the persistence and the other way round: e.g., bob and weave suggest both subtlety and persistence in the mouth, as reinforced by their co-text.
In sum, motion expressions in tasting notes provide information about what wines smell, taste, and feel like in a dynamic rather than in more conventional or literal static way, highlighting particular aspects of those sensory experiences. The idiosyncrasies of smell, taste, and mouth feel in relation to wine may be seen as constraining the type of verb used (Caballero 2007) . As happened with architects, the culture built around wine-tasting experts determines the way motion metaphors are conventionally used in that community. slowly from the bottom of the glass until it grows when entering the nose that waits. The volume is evident in the mouth, and a complexity of fruit wraps the mouth cavity gently'.)
Here, similarly to what happens in English, the Spanish verbs arrancar ('start off', 'depart', 'run away'), girar ('spin'), ascender ('go up'), adentrarse ('walk into'), volar ('fly'), recorrer ('move', 'go around a place'), curvarse ('curve', 'bend'), alcanzar ('reach'), flotar ('float'), and emerger ('emerge') are used in architectural assessments to describe what a spatial entity -a whole building or parts of it -looks like. Likewise, the verbs aparecer ('appear'), dar paso ('give way'), salir ('go out'), desplegarse ('fan out', 'unfold'), discurrir ('move', 'go around a place'), fluir ('flow'), and entrar ('go into') in wine-tasting notes describe the organoleptic properties of the wines and are chosen in agreement with the intensity and persistence dimensions to be communicated to potential drinkers.
The findings sustain the satellite-versus verb-framed categories within which English and Spanish have been classified (Talmy 2000) : the English verbs encapsulate richer information about the particulars of motion, whereas most Spanish verbs lexicalize the direction of motion. Accordingly, the English data are more expressive and detailed than the Spanish (Caballero & Ibarretxe-Antuñano 2013, forthcoming) . That the communities of architects and wine critics in such typologically different languages use motion to articulate spatial and organoleptic experiences reinforces our claim concerning the importance of culture in metaphorical thinking and communication. A look at how different communities use metaphor underlines the need to take the notion of acculturation into account in metaphor research: i.e., the impact of discourse interaction on the entrenchment and elaboration of the metaphorical scenarios that underlie the worldview and language of a given community. Only after getting familiar with and learning how to use these metaphors will the new members of a culture acquire full-membership status -in the process further reinforcing the metaphors that characterize the culture of which they have become part.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: THE IMPORTANCE OF C(c)ULTURE IN METAPHOR RESEARCH
We have discussed some of the key issues involved in metaphor research. By looking into perception and motion metaphors, we have shown that metaphoricity is relative rather than absolute: it needs to be addressed from a cultural perspective, taking into account the communities (cultures) that use metaphor as well as the broader contexts of those communities (Culture). We agree that COGNITION IS PERCEPTION is bodily grounded and widely used across several languages. That said, to ascertain the perception mode(s) involved in the metaphor, one needs to explore the way the idiosyncrasies of the Culture(s) articulated by those languages mediate between senses and world. We also agree that the same metaphorical source domain -e.g., motion -can be found in different contexts such as wine and architecture. Only by being acquainted with the shared interests, goals, and needs of a community can the metaphors at play be thoroughly understood, with all their nuts and bolts.
To this end, we have proposed the idea of a culture sieve: a mediating mechanism that helps physical, sensorimotor-based, universal experiences sift through the complex, socially acquired beliefs, knowledge, and worldviews intrinsic to one or several C/cultures. Only by taking this sieve into account will one be able to provide a full picture of the weight of conceptual metaphor in language, thought, and communication.
